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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Study .Objectives
The purpose of this study is to provide NASA with
additional information which it can use in its planning to insure
that its commercial research and technology programs are comple-
mentary to internally financed private sector activities. The
main concern was to identify the characteristics of productive
projects that firms are unlikely to invest in; discussions held
with industry show that:
o If it is difficult to assess the commercial relevance
of an R&D project or if it is characterized by high
technical risk, or a relatively long payback period,
1
then it is unlikely to be funded privately.
o If a project is large relative to the size of the firm,
then it is unlikely to be funded in the early stages of
the R&D process.
Firms tend to "underinvest" in projects with these
characteristics.
1
Some research may be conducted at the basic level, but very
little basic research is done in the private sector.
Gellman Research Associates, Inc.
These results are consistent with a previous study by
2
Gellman Research Associates, Inc. (GRA) and with studies of
other industries.
Definition of Underinvestment
The previous study was based upon the existing economics
literature and other literature pertaining to aeronautical
research and development activities. That study, showed that
firms in the aeronautics industry lack sufficient incentives to
conduct socially optimal levels of R&D. Often, while industry
returns (and other benefits) from particular projects may warrant
investment from a social point of view, no single firm can
realize sufficient returns to induce it to invest in these
projects. This is the underinvestment problem.
Summary of Findings
The results of the study are based upon discussions with the
12 major U.S. aeronautics manufacturers listed in the
Acknowledgement Section in the front of this report. The
findings can be summarized under three topics:
o R&D Decisionmaking Criteria.
o What Can Cause Underinvestment.
o Likelihood of Firms Funding R&D Activities.
2
Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and
Technology Policy: "Aeronautical Research and Technology Policy"
Volume 2: Final Report [November 1982] Chapter V and Appendix C.
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R&D Decisionmaking Criteria
The discussions focused on how private aeronautics firms
made decisions to spend their own money on R&D projects. In
general, firms looked upon R&D projects in the same context as
other investments.
o R&D projects were typically justified by their
relevance to products and product concepts defined in
the firms' strategic plans. The only exceptions were
the few firms that conducted some basic research,
o As with other investments, firms also use return on
investment (ROD criteria for certain R&D activities.
Development and some technology demonstrations are
subjected to ROI studies. Applied programs are usually
too far removed from the market to be evaluated in this
way; instead, resources are allocated to applied
research activities according to their relevance to the
products and product concepts in the firm's strategic
plan.
Basic research projects are not justified in terms of the
strategic plan or ROI studies. Instead, firms that do basic
research treat it as a fixed input.
Most importantly, firms do not allocate significant
resources (relative to the size of the firm) to an R&D project
unless it is justified in terms of both the strategic plan and an
adequate return on investment.
Gellman Research Associates, Inc.
What Can Cause Underinvestment
The results of the discussions with industry are consistent
with the factors that can cause underinvestment identified in
GRA's earlier study. There are four categories of factors that
can cause a firm to forgo an R&D project even when it is
productive. Each of these is briefly discussed below.
Problems of_Appropriability
A firm may have trouble appropriating the benefits of an R&D
project under two circumstances. First, the firm may be unable
to assess the commercial relevance of a. project. For example,
firms are very unlikely to undertake large scale-basic research
projects because in the aeronautics industry they are so far
removed from commercialization.
Second, a firm may have trouble capturing sufficient
benefits to justify an. investment because the technology is
easily copied or can otherwise be exploited by someone other than
the innovator. The relative ease of transfer of military
propulsion technologies into civil aviation in the 1950's is one
example of this phenomenon.
Technical Risk
The survey findings indicated that the willingness of firms
to accept technical risks declined significantly as a project
moved through the R&D process. One key objective of applied
research and technology demonstration is to wring out most of the
technical risk before development takes place. Even at the
Gellman Research Associates. Inc.
applied stage, because the technology is linked to product
concepts on which the firm depends, heavy investment in high risk
activities is unlikely.
Long Payback Period
The strategic plans of firms extend to between five and
fifteen years, depending upon the technology involved. When
devoting significant resources to a project however, firms expect
earlier payback to be forthcoming. That is, in their return on
investment analyses, firms will plan on relatively short payback
periods for technology demonstration and development projects.
Whether or not these early paybacks are forthcoming will depend
upon the market, but few projects will be commercialized if their
planned paybacks are excessive.
Large Size of Projects_Relative_to the_Minimum Efficient
Size Firm
In general, firms devote significant resources to projects
only when they can access their benefits. Very large projects
early in the R&D process are virtually unknown. The size of a
project that a firm will be willing to undertake at any stage in
the R&D process will depend upon the technology involved, and the
size of the firm. But, firms show great reluctance to undertake
large projects at the basic and applied stage in the R&D process.
Likelihood of Private Firms Internally Funding R&D Activities
With the factors defined, one objective of the study is to
provide a framework which can be used to supplement current NASA
Gellman Research Associates, Inc.
decisionmaking. The approach is to utilize these characteristics
of projects in order to determine those productive ones which
firms are likely to shy away from. Not explicitly considered are
the technical merits of any project or its ultimate value in the
marketplace. But obviously, the potential productivity of any
R&D activity is relevant in both the private and public sectors.
Here, the objective is to identify those projects which the
private sector is unlikely to invest in; if those projects are
productive, then they should be properly considered by NASA.
The results are summarized in Table 1.1. Each cell in the
Table defines how firms are likely to react in terms of their
willingness to internally fund an R&D project. The Table can be
quickly summarized in the following manner:
o If a firm is having trouble assessing the commercial
application of an R&D project or if it is characterized
by high technical risk, or a long payback period, then
it is much less likely to be funded if it is to take
place in the later stages of the R&D process.
o If an R&D project is large relative to the size of the
firm, then it is much less likely to be funded in the
early stages of the R&D process.
Of course, a project may be characterized by more than one of the
characteristics in Table 1.1, in which case the probability of
its being funded is reduced still further.
An example may demonstrate more clearly how the results of
the study can be used by NASA. One of the radical new
6
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technologies that holds great promise for aeronautics propulsion
is structural ceramics. Discussions with industry, however, show
that:
o Firms do not currently include the technology in their
product concepts, and therefore cannot assess its
commercial potential.
o The technical risk in commercial figurations would seem
to be high; currently, for example, the systems are not
reliable for one-time use in cruise missiles.
o The technology appears to be about 20-30 years from
commercialization, well beyond the 15 year duration of
even the longest corporate planning horizons.
o The size of the project at each stage in the R&D
process may exceed that which is typical.
o The technology does not appear to be well enough
developed to even hazard a guess as to ultimate
capturability of benefits to the first firm to enter
the market. But, the present early experiments would
seem to have wide applications (including to
automobiles), and so are not likely to be capturable
solely by aeronautics firms. Indeed, the Japanese are
funding a cooperative research program in this area
which includes both automobile and aeronautics firms.
These attributes of structural ceramics projects, assuming
their technical merit and social value, would seem to make them
candidates for NASA funding.
8
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We suggest that the application of these characteristics to
other emerging aeronautics technologies will aid NASA in making
appropriate funding decisions.
Shown in Table 1.2 are some of the other notable findings of
the study. All of these findings are discussed in detail in
Section IV, which presents the results of the interview program.
In Section II, the theory of private sector R&D decisionmaking is
reviewed. Section III reviews the methods employed in the
interview program. Finally, the policy implications summarized
above are more fully developed in Section V.
Gellman Research Associates, Inc.
Table 1.2
OTHER SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
Firms or divisions of large multiproduct
corporations that produce engines and heli-
copters tend to allocate a higher percentage
of the internally funded R&D budget to research
activities.
A much smaller percentage of internal R&D budgets
is allocated to research by general aviation
firms.
Significantly more basic research is conducted
by large, multiproduct firms which are able to
apply the results over a broad range of products.
However, basic research usually is less than
one percent of the internally funded R&D budget.
Virtually all applied research is tied to the
products or product concepts defined in the firms'
strategic plans. The results are therefore
expected in the near term and firms generally
shy away from high risk applied projects for fear
of missing objectives defined in the plan.
Technology demonstrations are carried out (for
the most part) only to eliminate technical risk
10
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Table 1.2 (cont.)
in a development program. Technology demonstrations
subject to high risk, long payback, and/or unclear
commercial .relevance are unlikely to be undertaken
in the private sector.
Most strategic plans cover time periods of between
5 and 10 years. Since most R&D is justified in
terms of the strategic plans, this suggests that
firms tend to shy away from long-term research
projects.
Strategic plans are guided primarily by the firm's
perception of which products and product concepts
are likely to sell in the market. It is the
technical feasibility of these products and product
concepts that concern the private firm, not the
feasibility of technological advances themselves.
11
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SECTION II. ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE SECTOR R&D FUNDING
Introduction
In this section of the report, the economics of private
sector R&D decisionmaking are briefly reviewed. The main focus is
on those circumstances in which a firm will choose not to expend
its own funds on R&D projects which are productive to society in
general. In such circumstances, a firm can be said to be
"underinvesting" in R&D. To economists, such situations are
termed "market failures"--!.e., instances where the market fails
to provide the correct signals for decisionmaking. When market
failures occur, government intervention is justified to correct
the allocation of resources so that society can benefit from
projects that otherwise would not be internally funded in the
private sector. Obviously, defining such circumstances is
relevant to defining NASA's role in the aeronautics industry.
This section of the report presents the theory of R&D
decisionmaking in the private sector, and those problems which
can cause underivestment. In order to test for the existence of
these problems, GRA discussed with major aeronautics firms their
decisions concerning internally financed R&D. The results of the
discussions are provided in Section IV and their implications for
NASA participation in R&T are reviewed in Section V.
12
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Economics of R&D
R&D is an input into the firm's production activity. As
with other inputs—such as labor, capital, interest, etc.--the
firm attempts to optimize the use of R&D in order to maximize its
profits. In theory, the firm increases its R&D activity until
the marginal benefit received equals the marginal cost incurred.
The benefits of R&D are defined in terms of "the technical
enhancements to the firm's products and ultimately by their
market value. Ideally, the firm would like to know the marginal
revenue product of each additional unit of R&D; ideally, it would
like to measure the change in its revenues due to the expenditure
of an additional hour.of a scientist's time on a given project.
If the marginal revenue product of a scientist's time exceeds the
firm's costs, then it makes sense to allocate an additional hour
of the scientist's time and related resources to the project; if
the reverse is the case, then the project should be avoided or
discontinued. Obviously, such theoretically correct evaluations
are difficult in the real world, but the closer the firm can come
1
to realizing such measurements, the more likely it is that it
will be able to optimize the production of R&D--equalizing
marginal benefits and costs.
A more familiar way to view appropriate criteria for
making R&D and other investment decisions is to note that it is
1
Here we are assuming the costs and benefits of collecting
information have been optimized.
13
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the firm's objective to maximize its long term net present value.
Given its finite resources, it attempts to select projects with
the highest returns on investment (ROD, which in turn maximize
the value of the firm for its stockholders. In formal planning
studies, most large firms attempt to make such ROI evaluations,
which involve forecasting the timing of costs and revenues and
taking account of alternative opportunities for the resources
deployed. These ROI studies are the real world approximations of
the theoretical measures discussed above.
The Underinvestment Problem
There are reasons to believe that private sector
decisionmaking with regard to R&D may not always be socially
optimal. There may be cases where R&D projects have an adequate
return to society, but inadequate returns for a single firm. In
such cases, firms are said to be "underinvesting" in R&D, from
society's standpoint. This conclusion is not meant to disparage
the private sector; in fact, there is every reason to suspect
that each firm is rational in pursuing its R&D activities.
Rather, these cases where underinvestment exists or is likely to
exist are logical candidates for government activity, so that
society can realize the benefits of projects which are productive
to society and otherwise would be underfunded by the private
sector alone.
There are many reasons why firms may underinvest in R&D
activities. One example may clarify the point, however. Suppose
14
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a firm considers a project whose costs are $8 million and where
2
benefits (to the firm) are $10 million. Given these circum-
stances, the firm would be likely to invest. Now suppose the
firm finds it can only realize (or "appropriate") $7 million in
benefits because a competitor'will be able to copy the results of
the project at little or no cost and thereby realize the
remaining $3 million. Under these circumstances, the firm would
be unlikely to invest its own funds. Nevertheless, some form of
government participation could make the project attractive enough
to the innovating firm to undertake the project and thereby allow
society to realize benefits which otherewise would be lost. This
is one example of the underinvestment problem and how government
participation can ameliorate it.
Underinvestment in R&D Can Be Caused By Appropriability Problems
There are two related kinds of problems which can arise
in R&D activities that make it difficult for a firm to capture
sufficient benefits to justify a project that is otherwise
attractive to society. These "appropriability" problems that can
cause underinvestment are:
o Problems in assessing the commercial value of R&D.
o Problems in capturing the benefits of R&D.
Each is discussed in turn below.
We assume these costs and benefits are discounted
appropriately.
15
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Problems in Assessing the Commercial Value of R&D
One problem that can arise in R&D activities is that a
firm can sometimes have difficulty identifying the commercial
relevance of a project. The less clear the commercial
relevance--!.e., the less it can be directly related to- the
firm's current or planned products--the less decisionmakers are
able to evaluate the potential benefits of the R&D activity.
Obviously/ there are gradations of this problem. An exercise in
pure mathematics will be more difficult to assess than a wind
tunnel test of an airfoil which in turn is more distantly related
to commercial activities than an initial flight test of a new
commercial aircraft. Given the fact that a firm will have
limited resources, it is likely to devote more of these resources
to activities it can assess well.
Problems in Capturing the Benefits of R&D
Another problem of appropriability springs directly from
the nature of some technology; there are two relevant types:
"neutral" and "proprietary" technology.
Proprietary technology includes activities for which
individual firms are able to capture a return sufficient to
justify investing in an R&T project. Developmental activities--
e.g., developing a specific aircraft for commercial use--could be
regarded as proprietary. A firm decides to pursue a product
development because it believes it can capture sufficient
16
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benefits from these activities. The firm therefore will be able
to make straightforward investment decisions with regard to
proprietary technology.
In contrast, neutral technology represents R&T activities
on which it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, for
individual firms to earn proprietary rates of return sufficient
to economically justify initial investment costs. This problem
occurs either because large investments in facilities are
necessary to undertake such R&T activities or because the R&T
benefits flow to other concerns, in either the same industry or
other industries. Neutral technology is a common base for
several different firms, for several reasons:
o Knowledge is expensive to produce but cheaper to
reproduce. A firm or institution that creates
knowledge sometimes must incur substantial expenses,
but others may reproduce, imitate, or learn the
knowledge at relatively low cost.
o use of the patent system to appropriate returns from
R&T is difficult and costly in the aeronautics industry
because technological advances often depend on
knowledge of specific processes--e.g., supersonic flow
in aeronautics--instead of some mechanical or
electronic device.
o while knowledge that flows from R&T efforts is a
commodity in the sense that it embodies some value, it
is unique because it may be reused, both by the
17
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innovator and by those who Learn it, without
diminishing its value in production. Therefore, apart
from the relatively minor expense and low risk of
learning new knowledge, it is as valuable to the
imitator as to the innovator, at least in terms of its
value in production.
Where neutral technology is involved, each firm pursuing
its own maximum profits will invest in these R&D activities only
until its own marginal benefits equal marginal costs. However,
the productivity, and hence efficiency, of other firms in the
industry is influenced by this R&D decision. For example, each
dollar of R&D not undertaken by Firm A reduces Firm B's pro-
ductivity (as well as the productivity of other firms in the
industry). Firm A, however, considers only its own return on
R&D, and not the returns of others in the industry, in making R&D
investment decisions. In short, Firm A will tend to underinvest
in R&D because it cannot capture all the benefits derived from
its own R&T projects.
If each firm recognized spillover benefits to industry
rivals, and also had the altruistic motive of maximizing total
benefits flowing from R&D instead of just those that are
privately captured, all firms would increase the level of R&D
output and thereby increase the total amount of benefits flowing
from R&D efforts to the socially optimal level. Since firms
typically do not have such altruistic motives, they are likely to
underinvest in neutral technology.
18
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Sections IV and V contain examples of those projects
likely to have neutral technology characteristics. Obviously, in
actual markets, the problems relating to neutral technologies are
a matter of degree. But, this concept and the resulting "under-
investment in R&D" are central to defining NASA's (the
government's) role in R&D.
Underinvestment in R&D Can Also be Caused by Problems Associated
with Risk, the Payback Period, and Scale Economies
Other problems can also arise due to risk, long payback
periods, and the scale economies associated with some research.
These problems are illustrated briefly below.
Risk
Suppose a firm is considering a potential R&D project and
the cost of the project is known with certainty to be $8 million.
For the sake of simplicity, further assume only two outcomes are
possible: the R&D project will yield zero benefits, or the R&D
project will yield total benefits of $20 million. If the two
outcomes are equally probable, then the expected payoff from the
R&D project will be $10 million. This expected payoff is
sufficiently large to cover the certain costs of the R&D project,
and will produce an expected net benefit of $2 million. Nonethe-
less, the consequences of failure may be unacceptable to the
firm. Thus, even when a firm can accurately assess the benefits
of R&D, aversion to risk can cause it to forego productive R&D.
19
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Risk is directly related to the size of a project; the
larger the downside potential, the greater the aversion to a
project is likely to be. Standard portfolio-selection theory
provides some useful insights into the types of incentives firms
have to conduct risky R&D projects. If the probability distribu-
tion characterizing the range of possible outcomes flowing from
an R&D project is "well-behaved," then firms can reduce risk by
diversifying into a large number of relatively small propjects.
If, however, the nature of the industry is such that diversifica-
tion into a large number of small projects is not feasible, then
risk reduction through diversification will not be feasible.
Consider two firms, A and B, each having a net worth of $10
million. Suppose further that Firm A, because of the nature of
the market within which it operates, can conduct 10 separate R&D
projects, each costing $1 million. Firm B, on the other hand,
has only one R&D option, a $10 million project. Even if the
expected payoff from the R&T activities of each firm is the same,
Firm A, by diversifying into several smaller projects, will face
considerably less risk than Firm B. Thus, the size of an R&D
project affects a firm's willingness to undertake it.
Payback Period
The payback period can be defined as the interval between
the time at which expenses in a particular project are first
incurred and the time at which sufficient revenues are obtained
to achieve a break-even point. From the perspective of the
20
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owners or stockholders in a particular firm, the payback period,
in isolation, should not influence a firm's incentive to under-
take investment projects. Standard economic theory states that,
regardless of the timing of returns on a project, it should be
undertaken as long as it increases the net present value of the
firm. Moreover, should they require cash, the owners of a firm
theoretically can sell their assets at any time for a market
price reflecting the assets' discounted value. However, two
i
factors complicate the payback-period issue: management
incentives to undertake projects with relatively short payback
periods, and the relationship between the payback period and
risk.
Much recent literature has focused on the problem that R&D
projects typically have lengthy payback periods, while management
has incentives to undertake projects with relatively short pay-
back periods. At almost any level in the management hierarchy of
a given firm, promotion opportunities for individuals depend on
their short-term performance. For example, basic research, which
is the furthest removed from commercial exploitation, is the
least likely to be undertaken, given the short-term incentives of
management.
The payback period and risk are also related; that is,
the longer the payback period for a particular project, the
greater the risk or uncertainty embedded in the project. Suppose
it is known a particular project will have a payback period of 20
years. Even if the firm is certain this'R&T project will yield
significant benefits in terms of today's markets, it will face
21
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considerable uncertainty regarding the value of those benefits 20
years hence. Uncertainty regarding both market demand for the
product, as well as market conditions for necessary productive
inputs, may cause the firm to forego a productive investment
opportunity.
Problems of Scale in R&D
The existence of significant scale economies may also
make it difficult for individual firms to realize sufficient
private return on neutral R&T. Often, R&T requires large
capital-intensive facilities—e.g., wind tunnels, flight test
facilities, propulsion facilities and special capability
facilities. The returns capturable by a single private firm are
often not sufficient to justify extensive investments in these
capital-intensive facilities. If the facilities are not other-
wise available outside of the firm, some productive R&D will be
foregone by the private sector.
Summary
A number of circumstances can interfere with a firm's
willingness to undertake productive R&D projects. They are:
o Difficulty in assessing the commercial value of a
project.
o Problems in capturing the benefits of a project,
o Problems of scale,
o High risk.
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o Lengthy payback period.
In the foregoing discussion, the problems have been highlighted
separately. A firm will typically find, however, that more than
one of these problems will characterize a particular project.
In order to evaluate how these problems affect internal
. funding of commercial aeronautics projects in the private sector,
discussions were held with the major commercial aeronautics manu-
facturers in the U.S. The format of these discussions is
described in Section III.
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SECTION III. FORMAT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH INDUSTRY
As part of our research we held discussions with 12
commercial aeronautics companies in the United States. The
results of these discussions and their implications are reported
in Sections IV and V. The format of these discussions is
reviewed below.
Objective of Discussions
Section II covered the problems firms sometimes have in
undertaking certain types of R&D investments. A more thorough
review of the theoretical principles underlying these problems is
contained in our report to the Office of Science and Technology
Policy contained in "Aeronautical Research and Technology Policy"
(Volume 2, Appendix C, November 1982). In that report, GRA also
provided analytical information based on published literature.
In this study, we wanted to further test our hypotheses by
holding discussions with key decisionmakers whose responsi-
bilities included development of aeronautics R&D budgets and
their allocation among different R&D types. The purpose of the
discussions was to uncover how these decisionmakers handled
various problems identified in the previous study and summarized
in Section II of this report. Ultimately, this information would
provide further guidance in defining NASA's role in commercial
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R&T, and in identifying the characteristics of productive
projects in which the private sector is likely to underinvest.
Structure of Discussions
The discussions can be loosely divided into four general
areas. The first objective was to identify the operational
definitions of R&D used by these firms in their planning. This
involved relating their internal definitions of R&D activities to
those used by NASA, and DOD, and those found in the general
literature. This was necessary to distinguish between types of
research--!.e., basic, applied, technology demonstration and
development projects. It was important that these distinctions
be made not only because each firm's decisionmaking processes
would be different, but also because funding sources and budgets
could also be different.
With the general definitions out of the way, the second
part of the discussions explored funding sources for the various
R&D activities. Here, it was especially important to segregate
out the firm's own internally financed R&D activities (including
IR&D) from outside funding sources including DOD and NASA. A
firm's behavior is likely to be colored by the degree to which
its R&D is funded from the outside if only because it loses some
control over the types of R&D activities in which it is engaged.
But obviously the most important aspect of this phase of the
discussions was to focus attention upon that portion of the R&D
budget over which the firm had complete discretion. Its behavior
25
Gellman Research Associates. Inc.
with regard to these internal R&D budgets- would help to define
those projects in which the private sector is likely and unlikely
to become involved.
The third phase of the discussions focused more
specifically on the decisionmaking process of the firm and the
general criteria used to establish internally financed R&D
budgets. The focus was on individual types of R&D activities and
how budgets were allocated to each. This amounted to a
discussion of the firm's strategic planning activities as well as
its short-term budgetary procedures. The criteria used to
allocate funds to different research and development categories
are directly relevant to the characterization of the firm's R&D
investment decisionmaking.
Finally, the fourth stage of the discussions focused on
the methods and criteria used to allocate budgets to specific
projects. It was in these discussions that the decisionmakers
revealed their approach to handling the problems that can lead to
underinvestment in R&D.
Participating Firms
The discussions were held with 12 civil aeronautics firms
over" a four month period in early 1984. The companies that
agreed to participate were:
o Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, Division of the
«
Boeing Company,
o Boeing-Vertol Company, Division of the Boeing Company,
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o Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Division of McDonnell-
Douglas Corporation,
o Lockheed-California Corporation, Division of the
Lockheed Corporation,
o General Electric Aircraft Engine Group, Division of
General Electric Corporation,
o Pratt & Whitney Group, Division of United Technologies
Corporation,
o Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies
Corporation,
o Bell Helicopter, Division of Textron, Inc.,
o Gates Learjet Corporation,
o Beech Aircraft Company,
o Cessna Aircraft Company,
o The Garrett Corporation, Subsidiary of the Signal
Companies.
All of the participants were extremely forthcoming and helpful in
providing information for the study. In general, each of the
discussions lasted between two and three hours. Follow-up
discussions were held as necessary to clarify various technical
points.
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SECTION IV. INTERVIEW RESULTS
Introduction and Summary
Detailed descriptions and interpretations of the
responses obtained in the interviews are provided below in this
section of the report. What follows is a summary of the survey
results.
One of the key concerns with regard to the NASA Aeronautics
Research and Technology Program is that it not duplicate research
that is or would otherwise be done in the private sector. The
discussions with industry representatives were designed to
identify the decisionmaking processes used by civil aeronautics
firms to fund their own (internally financed) research. By
identifying the characteristics of projects the private sector,
will typically fund, we hoped to identify the characteristics of
>
any, remaining productive projects that NASA should consider
funding.
All aeronautics firms in our sample develop strategic plans
which define their current products and their product concepts
for the future. Investments in these products and product
concepts are subject to return on investment (ROI) studies.
These ROI studies become more detailed and rigor.ous, the greater
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the resources devoted to a project. In fact, no firms in the
sample will devote significant resources to a project without an
ROI study.
Internally funded R&D projects require investment of firm
resources. These projects typically support the products and
product concepts in the strategic plan. However, firms find it
more and more difficult to apply ROI criteria to R&D projects the
further the projects are removed from near-term commercial-
ization. In general:
o Firms are able to assess the likely returns on
investment on development projects. If a development
project meets a firm's hurdle rate of return and
supports the products or product concepts in the
strategic plan, it will devote resources (sometimes
significant resources) to the project.
o Most applied research is tied directly to the
objectives of the strategic plan, and is undertaken to
reduce or eliminate technical risk in specific
programs. However, firms usually cannot identify a
specific rate of return on .applied research programs.
As a result, firms typically do not devote significant
resources to any'one applied research project,
o A minority of the firms in the sample performed some
basic research. They tended to be large, multiproduct
firms that had a greater likelihood of realizing the
benefits of basic research. None of these firms could
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evaluate the rate of return on basic research, and only
sometimes could relate it to specific objectives in
strategic plans. Instead, most of these large,
diversified firms looked on basic research as a fixed
input to which a small percent (usually less than one
percent) of the firm's own R&D budget is devoted.
Typically, basic research projects are very small;
firms attempt to have many small basic projects going
at once in order to spread risks.
o Most firms perform technology demonstrations only if
there is no other way to reduce or eliminate the risk
in a project. Demonstrations are always tied directly
to the objectives in the firm's strategic plan, and
many firms are able to perform ROI analyses on them.
In summary, resources are allocated to all basic and most
applied research based primarily on technical criteria. Firms
have great difficulty evaluating the economic returns to either
type of research. Applied research is generally guided by the
objectives in the strategic plan, while basic research is usually
not tied to any specific product or product concept.
In contrast, development activities are always subject to
strict economic criteria and tied directly to the objectives of
the strategic plan. Firms will only allocate the significant
resources required for a development program when sufficient
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returns are forseen. Technology demonstrations have similar
attributes, although the economic criteria are sometimes more
difficult to apply
As was explained earlier, the interviews were divided into
four main topics:
o Definition of R&D activities.
o Funding sources.
o Internal R&D budget allocation procedures.
o Criteria and methods employed to evaluate individual
research projects.
The discussion that follows is organized to be consistent with
the structure of the interviews; that is, each of the four
central topics listed above is discussed in turn.
Definitions of R&D Activities
In this first section of the interview, an attempt was
made to establish agreed upon definitions of different R&D types
that would be the basis of later discussion in the interview.
Next, representatives of private sector firms were asked to
identify the extent to which their respective firms conducted
each of the different R&D types. Following this, they were asked
to identify important sources of external funding for R&D
activities. Finally, the interview subjects were asked to
describe internal R&D funding arrangements.
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At the beginning of the interviews, industry representatives
were asked if they were comfortable with the following typical
distinctions between different types of R&D:
o Basic Research--obtain knowledge or understanding of a
phenomenon (which might be relevant to an application).
o Applied Research--determine whether certain performance
can be achieved under at least some laboratory
conditions.
o Demonstration--determine that the new technology is
feasible in that the desired performance can be
obtained outside a laboratory setting (e.g., through
the use of a scaled-down model).
o Development--construct a prototype working model which
embodies the new technology.
Next, the interview subjects were shown the schematic
presented in Figure 4.1. The bottom row of boxes in this figure
attempts to identify the types of activities associated with each
of the R&D types. It was emphasized that a given R&D project may
cross over one or more of the R&D types; that is, it may not be
possible in all cases to fit individual R&D projects neatly into
any one of the boxes depicted in Figure 4.1.
In virtually all cases, interview subjects claimed no
difficulty in relating to the definitions of different R&D types
that were offered to them. Although it is difficult to ascertain
the precise degree to which different interview subjects
interpreted these definitions consistently, we found no evidence
32
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that significant misunderstandings existed. Mansfield et al.
(1971) made similar distinctions between R&D types in interviews
he conducted with private sector firms; he concluded, as we did,
that there was no evidence that respondents had significant
1
difficulty interpreting the different definitions.
Indeed, all of the interview subjects agreed that similar
distinctions between different R&D types were made within their
own firms. Often, however, different names were used for
different R&D types (that is, different from the names we
offered). In some cases, the interview subjects' nomenclature
for R&D types was used to facilitate the administration of the
interview.
There was, however, one notable exception to agreement on
the definitions of R&D types that were offered. Specifically,
several respondents noted that technology demonstration often
requires that use of large-scale models, rather than the use of
scaled-down models suggested in our example. They explained that
often the only feasible way of reducing the uncertainty
associated with a new technology is to test it on an experimental
aircraft while in flight.
1
Mansfield used definitions of different R&D types proposed
by the National Science Foundation, 1965. The National Science
Foundation definitions distinguish between basic research,
applied research and development, but do not distinguish tech-
nology demonstration.
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Internally Funded Research as a Proportion of Internal R&D
Next, the interview subjects were shown the schematic
illustrated in Figure 4.2. We explained that our primary
interest was in those research activities that were internally
funded.
Industry representatives were then asked to estimate the
proportion of internally funded R&D devoted to research. The
results are summarized in Table 4.1. Four of the respondents
indicated that internally funded research represents about 10 to
15% of total internally funded R&D. Nine of eleven respondents
fall within the 10 to 33% range. It is important to recognize,
however, that many of the subjects we interviewed represented
subsidiaries or divisions of parent corporations. Accordingly,
corporate-wide allocations may differ from those figures reported
in Table 4.1. This may be especially true for firms with large
divisions or subsidiaries that produce products and conduct R&D
for the military, or for those corporations that produce a wide-
range of other products that may be unrelated to the commercial
aeronautics market. In addition, four of the representatives
indicated -the existence of a corporate research laboratory.
Expenditures on research at these corporate-wide laboratories are
not included in the figures reported in Table 4.1.
It is important to note that the figures reported in
Table 4.1 reflect typical or average ranges in budget allocations
between research and development. In practice, the ratio of
expenditures on research relative to development varies over the
35
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Figure 4.2
R&D FUNDING
R&D Projects
Basic
Applied
Technology
Demons tra tion
Development
Funding
Focus of Study
Sources of
Research Funding
Military
(Includes IR&D)
Other
Government
Non-Profit
Institutions
Other Private
Firms
Other Outside
Sources
Internally
Funded
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Table 4.1
INTERNAL R&D BUDGETS:
ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Percent R to Number of
Total Internal R&D* Responses
10-15 4
20-33 5
40-50 2
Total** 11
*Some respondents are divisions or subsidiaries;
corporate-wide figures may differ from those reported,
**One respondent did not provide an estimate
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product development cycle. Expenditures on development
activities increase when firms decide to introduce major new
products into the market. In addition, some firms transfer
research personnel to development-related tasks during key phases
of the development cycle, thus reducing expenditures on research.
There were some notable relationships between the
characteristics of the firms and the ratio of internally funded
research to total internally funded R&D. Specifically:
o Firms that focus primarily on general aviation markets
tend to have a relatively low ratio of internally
funded research to total internally funded R&D.
o Large multi-product firms tend to have moderately
higher ratios of internally funded research to totally
internally funded R&D.
o Firms/divisions that produce engines and helicopters
tend to have the highest ratio of research to
internally funded R&D.
Proportion of Internally Funded^Research Accounted for by
Basic, Applied, and Technology_Demonstration
Next, industry representatives were asked to estimate the
percent of the internally funded research budget allocated to
each of the three research types--i.e., basic research, applied
research, and technology demonstration. Only three of the
respondents, however, were able to provide estimates that
distinguished between applied research and technology demonstra-
tion. This may have been clue, in part, to substantial cyclical
38
Gellman Research Associates, Inc.
variations in expenditures on technology demonstrations. It
appears that major demonstration projects are typically funded
when the firm attempts to reduce the technical risk associated
with a new technology that it wants to incorporate in a new
product. As a result, demonstration activities related to
technology validation are often sensitive to the product develop-
ment cycle.
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the estimates of the
percent of the total internally funded research budget that is
allocated to basic research. As this table indicates, a
relatively small proportion of the total research budget is
allocated to basic research. Eight of the respondents indicated
that their respective firms, divisions, or subsidiaries do
virtually no basic research. The other four estimated that basic
research constitutes between 5 and 10% of their total internally
funded research budget. Thus, applied research and technology
demonstration receive between 90 and 100% of all internal funds
allocated to research.
Given the estimates of the percent of research to the total
internal R&D budget provided in Table 4.1, it appears that basic
research, on an average, receives less than 1% of the total
internally funded R&D budget.
Again, it is important to note that the figures reported in
Table 4.2 may not reflect corporate-wide trends in budget allo-
cations. For example, those respondents representing firms which
had corporate-wide research laboratories indicated that these
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Table 4.2
INTERNAL RESEARCH BUDGETS;
ALLOCATIONS TO BASIC RESEARCH *
Percent Basic
Research to Number of
Total Research Responses
Virtually None 8
5-10 4
Total 12
*Some respondents are divisions or subsidiaries;
corporate-wide figures may differ from those reported.
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labs do primarily basic research. These figures are not re-
flected in Table 4.2. Three of the respondents that did no basic
research themselves indicated, for example, that they sometimes
sponsor basic research at corporate research laboratories.
When corporate-wide laboratories are considered, large
multi-product firms appear to fund significantly more basic
research. This result is not surprising. First, and perhaps
most obviously, large firms have greater financial resources to
fund research projects. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
these firms produce a wide range of products and are thus better
able to appropriate more of the benefits associated with
research. This is especially true for basic research since, a_
priori, one would expect a wide range of applications of basic
research, at least relative to more applied research where the
potential for application across a wider range of products is
limited. Thus, the ability of firms to appropriate the benefits
of basic research appears to affect their inclination to fund
internally basic research projects.
Funding Sources
The preceding discussions focused on making distinctions
between internally funded R&D and externally funded R&D. The
second phase of the discussion then turned to funding sources
both within and outside of the firm.
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External Funding Sources
The interview subjects were asked to identify the sources
and extent of external funds available for financing R&D
projects. The following sources of outside funding for R&D
projects were identified:
o NASA
o U. S. Military
o Foreign Governments
o The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
In addition, some representatives indicated that their research
departments, on rare occasions, did research that was financed by
other private-sector firms. They indicated, however, that such
funding was inconsequential relative to their total R&D
activities.
The extent to which external R&D funds are typically
available to the representatives of firms, subsidiaries, and
divisions interviewed, are summarized in Table 4.3. As this
table suggests, a wide range of variation in the sample is
observed. Three of the respondents indicated that external
funding represented a very small percent (i.e., one percent or
less) of total R&D. These firms indicated that, while they
generally viewed the externally funded projects as being signifi-
cant, the total impact on the R&D budget was negligible. Those
representatives of divisions or subsidiaries that received a
substantial amount of external R&D funding—usually from the
military—stated that relatively wide swings in externally
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Table 4.3
EXTERNAL R&D FUNDING SOURCES
Percent Funded Number of
Externally Responses
Very Small
(1% or less) 3
5-10 1
20-40 4
80-95 2
Total 10
*Some respondents are divisions or subsidiaries;
corporate-wide figures may differ from those reported.
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received funds were often experienced. Some also indicated th'at
several significant R&D projects were delayed and jeopardized
because of flucuations in outside funding.
Internal Funding Arrangements
In order to understand the process through which
internally funded R&D budgets are determined, we asked the
industry representatives several questions regarding internal
funding arrangements for R&D. The responses to these questions
are summarized in Table 4.4.
Ten of the twelve respondents indicated that separate
budgets for research and development exist within their firms or
divisions. Several of these indicated that separate budgets are
provided for different research types; one representative
indicated the existence of three separate research budgets within
the product division alone. Generally, the separate research
budgets were divided by different research types although all
activities do not always fit exclusively into a single type.
Departments engaging in activities most closely related to basic
research were most likely to have their own budgets. These
separate budgets are significant in that they suggest the possi-
bility that different procedures and criteria are applied to
allocate funds to activities related to basic research. This
issue is discussed in more detail later in this section. (See
the discussion of Table 4.6, beginning on page 71.)
As is indicated in Table 4.4, five of the respondents
represented subsidiaries or divisions belonging to firms that
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Table 4.4
INTERNAL R&D FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS
Funding
Arrangement
Number of Responses
(out of 12)
Separate Budgets for
Research and Development 10 out of 12
Separate Budgets for
Basic Research 4 out of 12
Existence of Parent
Corporate Research
Laboratories 5 out of 12
Direct Funding of
Specific Projects at
Corporate Labs by
Product Divisions 4 out of 12
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financed corporate-wide research laboratories. In four of these
cases, product subsidiaries or divisions sometimes directly
financed basic research projects conducted at these corporate-
wide laboratories. However, the product divisions' main involve-
ment was not direct funding but attempting to influence the
direction of activities at corporate labs to their ov/n needs.
R&D Budget Allocation Procedures
Having established the relative size of the internally
funded research budget, the discussions turned to how decisions
are made by the company with regard to the budget itself and to
individual projects. Ultimately, budgets for private sector
firms are determined by adding detailed budget lines from the
bottom up. Nonetheless, the process through which the size and
shape of the budget is determined is significant. Procedures
designed to determine budget allocations, for example, can place
constraints on R&D expenditures in terms of budget ceilings. In
addition, the criteria employed to allocate funds among research
activities directly influence activities in laboratories.
Each of the representatives was asked a series of
questions designed to describe the internal budget allocation
process for their respective firms, subsidiaries, or divisions.
The schematic in Figure 4.3 was presented to each interview
subject. First, we explained that we were interested in the
degree to which the budget planning process was centralized or
decentralized, and the roles that interactions between
46
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decentralized departments or offices and central corporate
offices played in forming R&D budgets. Next, we asked represen-
tatives to identify the criteria that are employed to determine
the size of the total R&D budget. Finally, interview subjects
were asked to describe the process and criteria used to allocate
the total R&D budget among different research types, and to the
extent possible, among different disciplines or functional areas
of research.
The process through which the internal R&D budget is
allocated appears to be similar across private sector firms. In
particular, each of the representatives indicated that the
corporate strategic plan is used to determine the size and shape
of internally funded R&D budgets. Although the details of the
strategic plan and the processes through which it is formed vary
across firms, no significant differences were described.
There are several features of corporate strategic plans
that are especially relevant to the present discussion. These
include:
o The length of the plan.
o The level of plan detail.
o The origin of the strategic plan.
o Interaction with technical personnel.
o Product concepts and R&D activities.
o Criteria for budget allocation among research types.
o Product concepts and R&D activities.
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Each of these features of strategic plans is discussed below in
detail.
Length Of Strategic Plans
As Table 4.5 indicates, six of the, respondents indicated
that their subsidiaries or divisions relied on a five-year
corporate strategic plan. Five of the other representatives
described strategic plans varying between 10 and 15 years. In
general, strategic plans are more clearly focused when the plan
year is closer to the current year. One representative of a firm
having a ten year plan, for example, indicated that any plans
extending beyond three years were somewhat speculative and that
any major current activities would have been planned three years
in the past. Another firm with a ten year plan also developed a
shorter, more detailed, five year plan. The degree to which
long-term plans are focused also appears to depend on the tech-
nologies. Engine producers, for example, appear to have more
detailed future plans, owing to numerous well-defined testing
phases required to bring new technologies and engines to the
market. Those firms receiving substantial external R&D funding
from the military also appear to have the longest strategic
plans. This is probably due to relative market stability of
military funding.
All of the corporate strategic plans described to us were
reviewed at least annually. Several of the representatives
indicated that their strategic plans were reviewed during the
course of the year as a standard practice. In addition, fairly
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Table 4.5
LENGTH OF STRATEGIC PLANS
Length of Strategic
Plan (Years)
Number of Responses
(out of 12)
10-15
Total 11
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radical changes in strategic plans may occur if the firm makes a
decision to terminate or speed-up a major project.
Although the evidence is only suggestive, the duration of
the corporate strategic plans provides information on the
inclination or willingness of private sector firms to engage in
long-term research projects. The prevalence of five and ten-year
plans suggests that firms, in general, are unwilling to commit
substantial funds to research projects expected to last beyond
the five or ten years. As we explain later in this section, all
major expenditures undertaken by the firm must be justified in
terms of the strategic plan. Thus, it is clear that the length
of this plan does place constraints on the type of research
undertaken.
Some caution, however, should be taken regarding the
interpretation offered immediately above. This does not mean,
for example, that research projects extending beyond the length
of the strategic plan are never undertaken. First, some research
projects eventually extend beyond the period for which they were
originally projected. Second, a strategic plan may, in some
cases, call for a particular research project to be initiated in
the future, recognizing that the completion of the project will
likely extend beyond the duration of the strategic plan. These
projects, however, are not likely to represent a significant
portion of the firm's internally funded research. This point is
discussed in greater detail below.
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The Level Of Plan Detail
The final versions of corporate strategic plans define
corporate activities, in varying degrees of detail, over the
duration of the plans. Detailed, current year budgets are
usually developed for consistency with strategic plans. However,
the final versions of plans are generally the products of multi-
phased interactions between corporate level planners and
personnel representing various functional areas (e.g., marketing,
manufacturing, engineering, and finance) of divisions or
departments associated with specific product lines. The levels
of detail contained in the original draft of the strategic plans
are also of interest for this study because these drafts usually
define the marketing goals of the corporation.
A few of the representatives of subsidiaries or divisions
of large multiproduct corporations indicated that the first stage
in the development of the strategic plan was the construction of
an "external world environment" statement or analysis that was
prepared by corporate level planners. Generally, the external
environment statement provides projections of scenarios exogenous
to the individual firm. For example, major political or inter-
national events (e.g., the likelihood of a war, or significant
changes in trade relationships) are projected in the external
world environment statement. Important demographic trends are
also noted, and the possibility of significant new markets
opening, or old markets declining, are described.
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The world environment statement, by itself, does not
typically identify specific products or detailed strategies by
which the corporation might capitalize on external factors.
Rather, the likelihood of significant events are described, and
individual subsidiaries, divisions, or product lines are expected
to develop detailed plans that recognize the major events
predicted in the environment statement. It should be noted that
those subsidiaries or divisions receiving external environment
statements proceeded at the next stage of the development of a
corporate strategic plan in a fashion nearly identical to those
firms that worked without such a statement.
At a minimum, most first drafts of strategic plans define
what several representatives referred to as "product concepts".
Product concepts describe or define general market slots for
specific products that will be produced in the future by the
company, and some contain detailed performance specifications.
More detailed specifications for individual products are
generally defined through subsequent iterations on the strategic
plan if they are not described in the original draft.
Some original drafts of the corporate strategic plans
contain very detailed performance specifications of products
including the number of passengers, aircraft range, aircraft
speed, and fuel consumption. Similarly, many of the original
drafts of strategic plans provide detailed specifications of
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economic parameters such as product price, market share
projections, cost projections, and product timing (i.e., when the
product is to be introduced to the market).
The level of detail contained in the original draft of
the strategic plan is significant in determining the size and
shape of the internally funded R&D budget. As we explain later
in this section, virtually all significant R&D activities under-
taken by the firm must be justified in terms of the corporate
strategic plan. (See discussion beginning on page 61.)
Origin Of Strategic Plans
Each of the interviewed representatives was asked to
identify the individual or group of individuals responsible for
writing the first draft of the corporate strategic plan. With
one exception, all of the representatives indicated that
committees or "councils" prepare first drafts. Generally,
several functional areas within the firm are represented on these
committees. One representative, for example, indicated that the
planning committee included personnel from engineering,
manufacturing, finance, marketing, and product support.
Despite the somewhat varied representation on these
committees, marketing personnel are included as members in
virtually all cases. In particular, marketing personnel appear
to provide input to define product concepts in terms of market
slots in which future production will be directed. As was noted
earlier, such initial input is significant to the extent that
virtually all R&D activities are justified in terms of corporate
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strategic plans. That is to say, the product concepts, which are
defined in terms of markets, dictate to a large extent, the size
and shape of internally funded R&D budgets.
Interaction With Technical Personnel
An important policy issue is the extent to which inputs
from technical personnel shape the R&D activities of private
sector firms. Some of the committees charged with the responsi-
bility of drafting original versions of corporate strategic plans
include technical personnel in their membership. The definition
of the product concepts appears to be the dominant feature of
original drafts of strategic plans.
Technical personnel serve two important roles in the
formation of the final corporate strategic plan. First, they are
generally asked to review and respond to the technical
feasibility of the various drafts of the strategic plan,
2
including the first draft. Second, technical personnel are
generally required to develop detailed R&D plans, including
budget estimates, that are consistent with the goals of the
corporate strategic plan.
Typically, the technical feasibility of corporate
strategic plans is defined in terms of several key parameters.
The most important of these include:
o the likelihood of technical success;
2
One representative did indicate that technical people
played only a very minor role, at any stage, in shaping the
corporate strategic plan.
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o the feasibility of meeting the schedule defined in the
strategic plan;
o the likelihood of completing projects within budgets.
Most of the respondents indicated that a final version of
the corporate strategic plan is developed after several
iterations between the committee responsible for the original
draft, and representatives of various functional areas of the
firm, including technical personnel. All functional areas of the
firm were then responsible for developing detailed plans of their
own—including detailed budget estimates — that are consistent
with or can be "justified" in terms of the final version of the
strategic plan.
Criteria For Budget_Allocation_Among_Research Types
The representatives of the various firms, subsidiaries,
and divisions were asked to describe the criteria used by their
respective firms for allocating the annual budget among different
research types--i.e., basic research, applied research, and
technology demonstration. Based on the responses obtained in the
interviews, it appears that most research budgets are derived
principally from the strategic plan; that is, most planned
research activities are designed for consistency with product
concepts defined in strategic plans.
Basic Research—Four of the respondents indicated that a
small portion of their total internally funded research budgets
do not have to be justified in terms of the strategic plan.
These "unjustified" activities, in most cases, can be classified
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essentially as basic research. It is also interesting to note
that these unjustified research activities, in each case, are
funded out of distinct and separate budgets.
Generally, however, the unjustified portions of research
activities are small relative to total research budgets. One
representative, for example, indicated that a special research
fund, which represents approximately 10 to 12 percent of the
total internally funded research budget, was set aside for a
research department whose activities were not predefined by the
corporate strategic plan. However, the administrator of the fund
was present at the interview, and indicated that he used the
budget to attempt to solve relatively short-term special problems
that surfaced during the development cycle.
Another representative indicated that a special research
fund independent of the strategic plan was established in his
firm, but it represented a maximum of only two percent of total
internally funded research. Two other respondents indicated that
their firms typically set aside between five and ten percent of
the internal research budget, unjustified in terms of the
corporate strategic plans.
Those representatives who indicated the existence of
independent research budgets were asked what criteria their firms
use to establish the size of such a budget. In most cases, the
size of the budget appears to be determined largely by historical
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precedent: that is, limited funds are allocated for research not
committed directly to projects or products related to the product
development cycle.
Some respondents indicated that the size of the
uncommitted budget is sensitive to corporate cash flow positions.
(For example, one representative indicated that while the firm
would incur debt to finance development costs, it would never
incur debt to finance research. Another representative indicated
that research funds or budgets are sensitive to the product cycle
since scientific personnel are moved from research laboratories
to development facilities during periods of heavy development in
an effort to allocate resources directly to problems that may
surface relative to projects close to commercialization.
The discovery that the uncommitted basic research budgets
in our sample are determined mostly by historical precedent
suggests that private sector firms performing basic research view
it as a quasi-fixed input to the production process. That is to
say, some (albeit small) amount of uncommitted basic research,
when combined with other resources employed by the firm such as
those directed to technology demonstration, product development,
manufacturing, and marketing, are useful in delivering final
products in the marketplace. Mansfield (1984) came to a similar
conclusion in a recent study of the effects of R&D tax credits on
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3
private sector R&D expenditures. His interpretation is
supported by Nadiri and Schanherman (1981) who find extremely low
4
price elasticity of demand for R&D. The price elasticity of R&D
measures the percent change (increase) in private sector R&D
expenditures associated with a one percent change (decrease) in
the cost of research. A low R&D price elasticity indicates that,
at least over the relevant range, the level of research expend-
itures by the firm is relatively fixed in that it is insensitive
to changes in R&D costs. The use of variable inputs (such as
those used in manufacturing) is more likely to be sensitive to
changes in the price of inputs.
The interview subjects were asked to indicate why their
respective firms provided funds for basic research activities
independent of corporate strategic plans. Three justifications
were mentioned. First, there is a small probability that
personnel engaged in basic research will produce an important
technical success which will result in commercial success.
Second, technical personnel engaged in basic research are some-
3
Mansfield, Edwin. Public Policy Towards Industrial
Innovation: An International Study of Direct Tax Incentives for
R&D. Paper presented at the 7th Annual Colloquium on Productivity
and Technology, Harvard Business School, 1984.
4
Naridi, I. and M. Schanherman. "The Structure of
Productivity, Technological Change, and the Rate of Growth of
Total Factor Productivity in the Bell System," IN T. Cowing and
R. Stevenson (eds.) Productivity Measurement in Regulated
Industries. New York: Academic Press, 1981.
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times useful for assimilating and interpreting basic research
available through the literature and other sources outside the
firm. Third, periodically rotating technical personnel into
basic research can improve morale and technical competence.
Applied Research—All respondents indicated that
virtually all applied research must be justified in terms of
strategic plans. As is explained later, most applied research is
directed to the eventual development of technologies embodied in
the product concepts identified as part of the corporate
strategy. Applied research projects are sometimes relevant to
several product concepts which constitute a product line.
Ultimately, the size of the budget allocated to applied research
depends on the technologies embodied in product concepts. The
relationship between applied research and product concepts is
discussed in more detail later in this section.
Technology Demonstrations--Technology demonstrations are
virtually always directly relevant to strategic plans. in most
cases, the firm has a rather clear picture of the product to
which the new technology will apply. Thus, the product concepts
are, in relative terms, clearly defined at this stage. Often,
technology demonstration is conducted only if technical risk
cannot be reduced to acceptable levels at the applied research
stage. Technology demonstration is also more likely to be
focused narrowly to one or a few products than applied research.
Finally, it should be noted that several respondents
indicated that their firms required even basic research to be
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justified in terms of strategic plans. Although it is difficult
to focus basic research to specific product concepts, the
companies claimed that it was possible to relate it to potential
downstream technologies that might be developed as a result of
further applied research and technology demonstration.
Conclusion: Strategic Plans Largely Determine the Allocation
of Resources Among Research Activities
The preceeding discussion suggests that virtually all R&D
activities conducted by private sector firms are justified in
terms of corporate strategic plans. Earlier, we noted the role
that the product concept played in the shaping of strategic
plans. The respondents provided relatively detailed information
regarding the interplay between the formation of the product
concept and the definition of the scope of internally funded R&D
activities. The discussion below describes the critical role
that the product concept plays in shaping R&D activities of
private sector firms. It is important to note, however, that
product concepts themselves are dynamic, and become more
detailed, the closer they come to the development stage.
The interplay between the product concept and R&D
activities is illustrated in the schematic displayed in Figure
4.4. As was explained earlier, the product concept is defined in
terms of a set of performance specifications, say, for a
particular aircraft. These performance specifications become
more clearly defined, the closer the product is to development.
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In turn, the performance specifications depend on a set
of technologies, some of which have already been demonstrated and
some which have not yet been proven. Virtually all research
activities of private sector firms are directed to reducing the
technical risk associated with these undemonstrated technologies
that are embedded in product concepts. As we explained earlier,
only some (but not all) basic research is not focused directly to
technologies planned for future products.
Two arrows flow to the product concept box in Figure 4.4.
First, product concepts are defined initially in terms of
available (i.e., demonstrated) technologies, and, to some extent,
those technologies being developed through research activities.
Second, the product concept evolves as the firm's research
activities define the feasible set of technologies, and hence,
the feasible set of performance specifications. Those per-
formance specifications relying on technologies that cannot be
demonstrated are eliminated, and feasible alternatives are
substituted.
The role that technology demonstration plays in the
process warrants further comment. In most cases, demonstration
activities are undertaken only after a product concept is well-
defined. Technology demonstration is often conducted only if
technical risk cannot be reduced to an acceptable level through
other research activities. However, because of substantial
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costs, it appears that firms are often unwilling to undertake
technology demonstration if significant technical risks are still
present.
To a lesser extent, these same comments apply to applied
research. One fundamental objective of research is to reduce the
risk associated with a potential technology. At the same time,
however, applied research activities at private sector firms are
dictated by the as yet undemonstrated technologies required to
satisfy the performance specifications of product concepts. The
product concepts defined in strategic plans, in many cases,
embody relatively low technical risk, and accordingly, the
applied research likewise tends to hold low or moderate technical
risk.
This finding is consistent with the discovery that
relatively few resources are devoted to funding basic research,
and that relatively few funds are devoted to financing
unjustified research (in terms of strategic plans). This dis-
covery is also consistent with an earlier observation by
Mansfield (1971). Specifically, Mansfield finds that most
internally funded research projects carry relatively low tech-
nical risk, and that in addition, the willingness of private
sector firms to accept technical risk is less than their
5
willingness to accept market risk.
5
Mansfield, Edwin, John Rapoport, Jerome Schee, Samuel
Wagner, Michael Hamburger, Research and Innovation in the Modern
Corporation. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971.
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This behavior is certainly understandable. Since
research activities precede the introduction of a new product
into the market, firms are effectively accepting both technical
and market risks in funding research. Once the firm reaches the
development stage of the cycle, however, most of the technical
risks embodied in the product have already been reduced or
eliminated. At this stage, market risk is the major problem
facing the firm.
Evaluation of Individual R&D Projects: Methods and Criteria
The primary objective of this fourth and final phase of the
interview was to discover how private sector firms make decisions
on individual R&D projects and to determine what characteristics
of individual projects lead to acceptance or rejection. In order
to focus the discussion, interview subjects were shown the
schematic illustrated in Figure 4.5.
We explained that our primary interest was in identifying
the criteria that were used to evaluate individual projects, and
to determine if different criteria or methods of evaluation were
used across research types, disciplines or functional areas, and
new existing projects. Three primary economic criteria upon
which such decisions are based were suggested: return on
investment (ROD, payback period, and risk.
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We further explained that there may be other criteria
used by the firm and asked that such criteria be identified.
Finally, the interview subjects were asked to describe the
definitions of the criteria that were employed and the techniques
that were used to measure the key parameters necessary for the
evaluations. In addition, the representatives were asked to
identify any secondary criteria that might be relevant to their
evaluation of individual R&D projects.
All of the respondents indicated that they employed some
or all of the primary criteria identified in Figure 4.5. As the
following discussion suggests, however, these primary criteria
are generally applied to the evaluation of specific products
(including development and some demonstration activities), but
not directly to research projects. Accordingly, research
projects are formally evaluated only to the extent that they
received implicit evaluation within the context of product
evaluations.
Return On Investment Criteria
All of the respondents indicated that their respective
firms, subsidiaries, or divisions employed the return on
investment criteria. In all cases, however, this criteria was
applied to specific products, and never directly to specific
research projects. As we suggested above, research projects are
evaluated implicitly by this criteria, to the extent that they
are included in the product evaluation process.
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The basic method for evaluating ROI that was described to
us appears to be standard discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis.
The following three classes of parameters are necessary to
implement this method:
o Projected revenues associated with the product (based
on estimated product price and market share).
o Costs — both nonrecurring (i.e., fixed costs including
research and development costs) plus recurring or
variable costs (e.g., manufacturing and selling costs).
o The timing of costs and revenues.
In addition, of course, an appropriate discount rate which
reflects the firm's marginal cost of capital is necessary to
implement the DCF method.
If research projects are to be implicitly evaluated
within the ROI product evaluation, the benefits and costs
associated with specific research projects must be included in
the revenue and cost estimates. Theoretically at least, the
appropriable benefits of research projects necessary to make
feasible the performance specifications embodied in the product
concept should be included implicitly in the projected revenues.
That is to say, both the price of the product and the estimated
market share (i.e., quantity sold) are a function of the
attributes of the product which have evolved from the product
concept. Such benefits should be included in revenue projections
for each of the several products for which an individual research
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project might be applicable. Research costs are nonrecurring and
should be treated as such in the ROI analyses.
Unfortunately, the preceeding prescription for evaluating
projects in terms of ROI is difficult to implement for research
projects. This is especially true for basic research; none of
the respondents indicated that basic research projects are
evaluated in terms of ROI, either explicitly or even implicitly
within the context of product evaluations. There are a number of
reasons for this.
First, it is difficult to project the downstream revenues
associated with basic research projects. The objective of basic
research is to obtain an understanding of a phenomenon. Even
after this is accomplished, there is no guarantee that any
commercial application will be possible. On the other hand, a
range of applications may be possible, but it is difficult to
identify the specific products to which they may be relevant, and
probably even more difficult to estimate product prices and
market shares. These problems are compounded in view of the fact
that most technologies make only marginal improvements in the
value of the product, but many potential improvements must be
evaluated simultaneously.
Second, the costs associated with the applied research,
demonstration, development, manufacturing and other activities
that follow basic research are difficult to forecast with
reasonable certainty. In short, it is difficult for the private
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sector firm to assess the downstream appropriable benefits
and costs associated with specific basic research
projects.
It also appears that private sector firms face difficulty
in formally assessing the downstream appropriable benefits and
costs associated with applied research and demonstration
projects. Only four of the respondents indicated that their
respective firms, subsidiaries, or divisions include applied
research projects in ROI evaluations. Six of the twelve
respondents indicated that technology demonstrations are
evaluated in terms of ROI. Again, in all cases, projects are
evaluated within the context of product evaluations. In general,
respondents stressed that their firms were generally unwilling
to commit any substantial funds to projects unless a thorough
economic evaluation of such projects was possible. Such an
evaluation requires that the benefits and costs associated with
the specific project can be evaluated. As we noted earlier, only
those benefits associated with a research project that are
appropriable are properly considered in any private sector
economic evaluation.
All actual benefits associated with a specific research
project may not be appropriable by the sponsoring firm, since
some of the benefits flow to other industries and to competitors
within the firm's own industry. In addition to these unappro-
priable benefits, we must include those benefits that might
otherwise accrue to the individual firm, but which are not
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perceived. In short, it is only those appropriable benefits that
are perceived that matter to the private firm.
The practices employed by private sector firms to assess
individual R&D projects shed some light on the degree to which
they are able to "perceive" or measure appropriable benefits
associated with different R&D types. Relative to other R&D
types, for example, the benefits associated with specific basic
research projects are most difficult to assess because they are
never evaluated through ROI analysis. At the other extreme, the
respondents indicated that development projects are almost always
evaluated in terms of ROI; thus, the appropriable benefits
associated with development are the easiest to measure or assess.
It is important to recognize that private sector firms
also attempt to evaluate the benefits associated with specific
R&D products in terms of relevance to strategic plans. This
evaluation process does not necessarily require numerical
estimates of appropriable benefits, but nonetheless, is made with
a view of market conditions since product concepts, a key
component of the strategic plans, are defined at least in terms
of market niches. In turn, market niches characterize, at least
subjectively, the expected appropriable benefits. Accordingly,
the degree to which R&D types are "justified" in terms of
strategic plans also reveals the ability of firms to assess
appropriable benefits.
Table 4.6 presents a ranking of the ability of private
sector firms to assess benefits of different R&D types in terms
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of relevance to strategic plans and ROI analysis. Basic research
is the most difficult to assess by either assessment technique:
it is justified in terms of the strategic plans "sometimes," but
is "never" evaluated in terms of ROI. Applied research is
"usually" justified by strategic plans, but is "usually not"
evaluated in terms of ROI. Technology demonstration is virtually
"always" justified by strategic plans, but only "sometimes"
included in ROI evaluations. Finally, development is virtually
"always" justified by strategic plans and "almost always"
included in ROI evaluations.
Although these joint rankings provide information on the
ability of private sector firms to assess appropriable benefits,
it should be recognized that the dominant assessment technique is
ROI analysis. This technique is dominant in the sense that
private sector firms do not generally commit substantial
resources to a project unless the application to a specific
product or product line can be identified, and the product itself
has undergone a rigorous assessment.
Since many of the respondents indicated that basic and
much applied research—and sometimes even technology demonstra-
tion--is not evaluated either implicitly or explicitly within the
context of formal product evaluations, we asked them to describe
alternative criteria that their firms use in making selections
among alternative potential research projects. The criteria
identified were very similar across all respondents. These
criteria include:
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o Promise of technical success.
o Relevance to product lines.
o Relevance to the strategic plan.
The promise of technical success was based primarily on the
recent history of the project as well as the past success rates
for the personnel associated with the project.
Identifying where Technical and Economic Criteria Dominate
Decisionmaking
The preceding discussion suggests that the process of R&D
decisionmaking can be segregated into areas in which economic
criteria and technical criteria predominate.
o Economic criteria dominate strategic plans which define
product concepts and performance characteristics.
Decisions concerning some technology demonstrations and
virtually all development projects are also dominated
by economic criteria.
o Technical criteria guide the selection of specific
basic research projects, many applied research
projects, and to some degree, even technology demon-
stration. Firms use technical criteria to guide
technology and research projects that are designed to
meet the "needs" defined in product concepts.
The product concept is evaluated using economic criteria
(i.e., ROI), but research and technology projects are not
generally evaluated directly using economic criteria. This, to a
large extent, defines the point in the R&D decisionmaking process
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where firms can assess the appropriable benefits associated with
a given technology. As was noted above, firms do not generally
commit significant funds until appropriable benefits are
perceivable.
The Payback Period
The interview subjects were asked several questions
regarding the payback period requirements for different R&D
types. Specifically, we attempted to obtain the following
information:
o The maximum acceptable payback period for different R&T
types.
o The maximum acceptable time period between project
start-ups and commercialization for different R&T
types.
o The maximum acceptable time period between project
start-ups and project completions for different R&T
types.
All respondents agreed that, other things being the same,
projects with shorter payback periods, times to commercial-
ization, and times to completion are preferred. None, however,
indicated that any absolute or maximum threshold criteria are
employed by their respective firms, subsidiaries, or divisions.
In practice, actual time periods vary substantially and depend
primarily on differences in technologies, product life cycles and
markets.
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It is notable that technology demonstrations conducted by
private sector firms usually are completed shortly before
development, and usually if a specific application is expected.
In addition, it appears that private sector firms do not often
engage in long-term basic research projects; that is, the time
between project start-up and expected project completion is
usually relatively short, and often shorter than that for applied
research. It should be stressed, however, that exceptions to
both of these observations were noted by the respondents.
The Evaluation Of Risk
Some type of risk analysis is conducted by all of the
firms represented in the interviews. In general, both the
overall technical risk embodied in the product concept, and the
technical risk associated with specific technologies are
evaluated. The degree to which formal risk analyses are
conducted, however, varies substantially across the representa-
tive firms. Specifically, practices vary from formal numerical
risk evaluation to less formal subjective evaluations.
Typically, risk is measured as a likelihood of an adverse
event occurring. Some firms attempt to estimate the probability
of a failure numerically; others attempt only qualitative
assessments (e.g., high, moderate, low). Finally, other firms
make no attempt at either quantitative or qualitative estimates
of risk, but considered it subjectively.
Risk is generally considered for the following specific
factors:
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o Technical feasibility--!.e., will the technology
operate as expected when embodied in a product concept?
o Budget risk—can the necessary result be obtained
within the research budget?
o Schedule risk—can the project be completed within the
schedule necessary for a planned product commercial-
ization?
Although some respondents indicated that their firms
would never undertake substantial development costs before a
rigorous assessment of the risks embodied in the product concept,
risk analysis for specific products is often made after a
decision to carry forth with the project has been made. First, a
return on investment analysis of a new or improved product is
conducted. This analysis generally precedes the risk evaluation,
sometimes by a period of a year or more. Risk analysis is then
conducted after detailed technical plans for the new project are
completed. Accordingly, risk is often not used as an evaluation
tool per se. Rather, it is used to identify those areas that
carry a high degree of technical risk so that technological
options can be developed. In short, risk analysis often tells
the firm that more analysis of a specific technological attribute
of a product may be required, and that technological options for
risky attributes should be developed.
Although exceptions can be noted, some observations on
the willingness of private sector firms to accept technical risk
in research projects are noteworthy. First, in virtually all
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firms, research projects must be justified in terms of product
concepts described in strategic plans which, in turn, limits the
riskiness of research activities since the product concepts them-
selves are usually defined in terms of demonstrated technologies
or technologies close to the demonstration stage.
Second, although basic research projects are often
unjustified in terms of product concepts, firms tend to minimize
risk by engaging in a large number of small basic research
projects. One representative, for example, indicated that he
currently was responsible for directing approximately 90
different research projects even though his total budget was
relatively small. Thus, where research projects are risky--such
as is usually the case with basic research — the private firm
tends to be a self-insurer by accumulating a diversified
portfolio of relatively small inexpensive projects. Given these
two observations, it is unlikely that many private sector firms
would be willing to undertake the substantial technical risk that
is associated with many of the large projects undertaken by NASA.
Third, firms tend to be risk averse in conducting costly
technology demonstration projects. The level of technical risk
is usually low, and, as noted previously, a specific application
is usually identified. Some respondents indicated that their
firms were reluctant to conduct technology experiments that might
apply to a range of products, for fear that the results of the
experiment might not be valid across aircraft types. Representa-
tives of some firms stated that they sometimes conducted large,
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risky demonstrations that might be relevant to military projects;
however, the potential for receiving IR&D credit mitigates
financial risk to the firm in these cases.
In order to determine the degree to which private sector
firms are willing to accept technical risk, interview subjects
were asked about success rates for past projects. None indicated
that such data were available, partly because of the difficulty
in defining "technical success." Most respondents stated, how-
6
ever, that success rates vary over time and across technologies.
6
National Science Foundation. Basic Research, Applied
Research, and Development in Industry. 1962. Published 1965.
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SECTION V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
, f
Introduction
In the last section, specific findings were reported with
regard to the motivations of commercial aeronautics firms to
internally finance research and development projects. Based on
these results, this section presents the policy implications, and
specifically addresses the question:
o What types of productive research and technology
programs are private sector firms likely to underinvest
in?
It is in these productive programs that NASA's involvement is
most needed.
Any evaluation of potential NASA projects must begin with
the technical merits of the proposed activity. These matters are
currently considered in NASA's decisionmaking process; projects
of high technical merit should ultimately lead to technological
advances which create social benefits. This does not mean that
it is NASA's role to bring these innovations to the marketplace,
but only to facilitate some productive technological activities
which the private sector can then commercialize and on which the
Department of Defense can also capitalize where this is feasible.
These project selection criteria are similar to those
considered in the private sector. Where the private and public
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sectors diverge is in their willingness to accept certain
project-specific characteristics relating to:
o Problems of appropriability,
o Specific economic characteristics.
Based on our discussions with key aerospace firms and previous
research, there are certain appropriability and economic
characteristics of programs which the private sector will avoid.
When these projects are likely to be productive—when they have
technical merit and create social benef its — then they are
properly considered as candidates for NASA sponsorship.
Defining The Characteristics Of Projects That Reduce Their
Attractiveness To The Private Sector
The relevant characteristics have been segregated into
two groups: those related to appropriability problems and those
related to specific economic characteristics of certain projects
which make them less attractive to the private sector. Below, we
review each of these characteristics in turn and then provide
conclusions about the likelihood of the private sector investing
in projects with one or more of these characteristics.
Appropriability Problems
We have segregated the appropriability problem into two
separate but related areas:
o Difficulties in assessing appropriable benefits of
projects,
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o Difficulties in capturing the benefits of research and
development activities.
Each of these is discussed in turn below.
. f
Assessing the Commercial Relevance of R&D Projects-- Pri-
vate firm investment decisionmaking, including that related to
R&D, is based for the most part on the firm's strategic plan
which in turn is a function of the availability of the commercial
opportunities. Typically, a firm will assign virtually all of
its limited internal R&D research resources to the products and
product concepts defined in its strategic plan; also, the firm
will be more likely to devote significant resources to a project
if it can measure a rate of return on the investment. Basic
research often cannot be related to the strategic plan and can
never be evaluated directly in terms of ROI. As a result, basic
research is done only by large, well diversified firms which look
upon basic research as a fixed input to their multi-product
production functions. Firms also have difficulty measuring the
private benefits (ROI) of most applied research projects; but
more resources can be devoted to applied research since its
relevance to products and product concepts can be identified. In
effect, the applied research is evaluated as a necessary input to
achieve the ROI projected for a product or product concept.
Firms are able to devote significant resources to
development programs because the ROI can be directly evaluated,
and the relevance to the strategic plan is direct--i.e., the
development project is usually one of the product or product
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concepts in the plan. The same is often, although not always,
the case for technology demonstration.
Insufficient Capturability of Benefits—There are at
least three separate but related reasons why firms sometimes find
it difficult to capture a sufficient amount of benefits to
justify investments in certain types of R&D activities. First,
there may be a large number of applications of a technology which
together would justify continuing a project, but the firm's
opportunity set does not include enough of them to produce
sufficient benefits. Second, there may be difficulties in
patenting R&D results which in turn reduces the likelihood that
the firm will be able to protect its innovations for a sufficient
period of time to reap sufficient benefits. Third, whether or
not the results are patentable, if they are easily replicated
(including avoiding a patent) then the firm is less likely to
garner sufficient benefits to justify the investment.
Obviously, the degree to which these problems of captur-
ability are important depends upon the technology and the markets
involved. Problems of capturability can and do exist at each
stage in the R&D process. The full benefits of basic research
are almost by definition, not fully capturable by the firm. The
results are unlikely to be patentable, and are likely to be
widely applicable. Whether or not they are easily replicable may
depend on the technology; new materials research may be harder to
replicate than aerodynamics advances, for example. The ease of
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replicability also depends on the amount and quality of informa-
tion published concerning the advance. But, in general, one
reason firms do very little basic research is the difficulty in
. f
capturing its full range of benefits.
At later stages in the R&D process, the capturability
issue has a direct impact in the ROI calculations firms make when
committing resources to technology demonstration and development
projects. Here the effects are much more direct: if the
capturability problem is severe enough, the private benefits of a
project will be insufficient to cover costs, and no further
internal funding will be forthcoming.
Other Economic Characteristics of Specific Projects
There are three relevant economic characteristics of
specific projects which can have an effect on the firm's
willingness to undertake certain R&D projects; they are:
technical risks, long payback periods, and large size of project
relative to the minimum efficient size of the firm. Each of
these is discussed briefly below.
Technical Risk—The survey findings indicated that the
willingness of firms to accept technical risks declined signifi-
cantly as a project moves through the R&D process. One key
objective of applied research and technology demonstration is to
wring out most of the technical risk before development takes
place. Even at the applied stage, because the technology is
linked to product concepts on which the firm depends, heavy
investment in high risk activities is unlikely.
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Long Payback Period—The strategic plans of firms extend
to between five and fifteen years, depending upon the technology
involved. When devoting significant resources to a project how-
. f
ever, firms expect earlier payback to be forthcoming. That is,
in their return on investment analyses, firms will plan on
relatively short payback periods for technology demonstration and
development projects. Whether or not these early paybacks are
forthcoming will depend upon the market, but few projects will be
commercialized if their planned paybacks are excessive.
Large Size of Projects Relative to the Minimum Efficient
Size Firm—In general, firms devote significant resources to
projects only when they can access their benefits. Very large
projects early in the R&D process are virtually unknown. The
size of a project that a firm will be willing to undertake at any
stage in the R&D process will depend upon the technology
involved, and the size of the firm. But, firms show great
reluctance to undertake large projects at the basic and applied
stage in the R&D process.
Likelihood Of Private Firms Internally Funding R&D Activities
With the factors defined, our objective is to provide a
framework which can be used to supplement current NASA decision-
making. The approach is to utilize these characteristics of
projects in order to determine those projects which firms are
likely to shy away from. Not explicitly considered are the
technical merits of any project or its ultimate value in the
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marketplace. But obviously, the potential productivity of any
R&D activity is relevant in both the private and public sectors.
Here, the objective is to identify those projects which the
. f
private sector is unlikely to invest in; if those projects are
productive, then they should be properly considered by NASA.
The results are summarized in Table 5.1, and each type of
R&D activity is discussed below.
Basic Research
In the survey, very few firms performed basic research,
and no firm devoted more than a few percent of its own R&D
resources to this activity. This is the case primarily because
basic research is most likely to be affected by all four of the
characteristics listed in Table 5.1. In short, basic research is
an activity which is most unrelated to commercial activities and
is subject to high risks and long paybacks whose results are
often unappropriable. Firms generally minimize these activities
and the majority of firms do virtually no basic research. For
this reason, it is generally accepted that basic research is
problematical in the private sector and is therefore an
appropriate public sector activity.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that some basic
research is done in the private sector, mostly by large, well
diversified firms. To be sure, these activities usually make up
less than one percent of the firm's R&D budget and the firm's
motives for performing basic research lie outside the normal
investment decisionmaking channels. In fact, many firms have
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separate budgets for basic research and the criteria used to
allocate those budgets are different from any other investment
criteria utilized by the firm. But, it appears that the possi-
„ #
bility of appropriating the benefits of the research are higher
in large, well diversified firms because of the greater number of
products over which this activity can be spread. Furthermore,
there are subsidiary benefits including raising morale and having
greater technical competence available to the firm.
In general, the likelihood of a particular basic research
project being funded in the private sector is relatively low, and
this is especially true of larger projects.
Applied Research
The single most important characteristic with regard to
applied research is that private firms are only likely to invest
in it if its commercial applications can be assessed in the
firm's strategic plan. This means, that in virtually every case,
applied research must be tied to specific product or group of
product concepts. Because of this linkage to product concepts
and the firm's immediate future commercial plans, it is also
unlikely that the private sector will be willing to undertake
high technical risk in applied research projects. Furthermore,
firms are very unlikely to devote significant resources to a
single applied research project because large resource commit-
ments in the R&D process are reserved for technology demonstra-
tions and development which are much closer to commercialization.
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Obviously, the interaction of these factors plays a
significant role in determining whether the firm is likely to
invest in a particular project. For example, some firms may be
willing to tolerate a small applied research project with
relatively high risk and a long payback that may extend for as
many as fifteen years. But it is very unlikely that it would
entertain such a project if it were large and/or if the
commercial applications were not well defined. In sum, it is the
interaction of the characteristics in Table 5.1 which is likely
to determine whether or not a firm will invest in an applied
research project.
Technology Demonstration
Many firms attempt to avoid this stage in the R&D
process. Indeed, many firms had no regular budget item for
technology demonstrations. However, in many cases, and
especially with regard to propulsion technology, it is necessary
to utilize technology demonstrations in order to reduce technical
risks before development and commercialization of a new .product.
Relative to applied and basic research done in a
laboratory, technology demonstrations are expensive. For this
reason, many firms have difficulty distinguishing between demon-
stration and development activities because they are so tightly
linked to a specific product. In fact, in some cases, technology
demonstration models become prototypes utilized in development
activities. Therefore, it is very unlikely that a firm would
fund a technology demonstration internally unless it knew its
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direct commercial relevance. In fact, many firms are able to
apply return on investment criteria to technology demonstration
investments. In addition, most of the technical risks in these
. f
privately funded activities have been wrung out in the
laboratory, although the degree will depend upon the technology
involved. But, technology demonstration is not a high risk
technical activity or at least it is not planned to be. It is
unlikely that a firm would fund a technology demonstration of a
radically new technology unless both the costs and likelihood of
success could be predicted with high accuracy. Because of its
nearness to commercialization, the planned payback period is also
likely to be short.
In general, then, any technology demonstrations subject
to high technical risks, long payback and/or unclear commercial
relevance are unlikely to be undertaken in the private sector.
For example, radically new technologies—e.g., structural
ceramics for turbine engines--seem to fall into this category.
Development
A development program is the final and most expensive
stage in the R&D process; it overlaps into the initial
commercialization of a new product. By definition then, firms
are able to assess the commercial applicability of the technol-
ogies involved in these programs.
Firms producing commercial aeronautics products never
undertake development without planning to wring out most of the
technical risk of a project either in the lab or in technology
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demonstration projects. The commercial aircraft market will not
pay for technologies which are unproven or incomplete and often
it will not wait for problems to be overcome.
Much has been made of the long payback cycles for many
aeronautics projects. However, firms seldom plan to develop
products with extremely long payback periods; it sometimes
happens, however, that the market does not develop as fast as was
forecast in the firm's strategic plans. Acceptable paybacks are
directly related to the duration of product life cycles. While
the paybacks in aeronautics projects on average may exceed those
typical in the electronics industry, they are consistent with the
average life cycle of these products. Firms are therefore very
unlikely to invest in development where the planned payback
extends beyond say ten years; the opportunity cost of the capital
and the interest charges for projects extending beyond this time
period are far too high.
Aeronautics firms are distinguished by their willingness
to accept very large size development projects. But these
projects are justified by standard return on investment criteria
which include market risk and payback considerations. The
willingness of firms to accept large projects given an acceptable
view of the market is perfectly rational.
Applying The Characteristics To Specific Projects
Given a large number of potentially productive projects,
it is suggested that NASA attempt to determine those projects
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most likely to be affected by one or more of the characteristics
listed in Table 5.1. The greater the severity and the greater
the number of characteristics exhibited by a potentially
. f
productive project, the more likely it is that the private sector
will not invest in it and that it properly should be considered
by NASA.
In order to implement the use of these characteristics,
we suggest that technical committees which already advise NASA on
project selection consider additionally the following simple
questions:
o Is the technology sufficiently well defined so that a
firm could plan to include it in its product concepts
covered by its strategic plan?
o Is the technical risk of the project significantly
greater than is typical for projects at the same R&D
stage?
o Is the expected payback period beyond the normal
product life cycle for similar products or
technologies?
o Is the project significantly larger than those under-
taken by firms at the same R&D stage?
o Are private firms likely to be able to capture
sufficient benefits from the results to pay for
investment in the project?
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It is the interaction of these characteristics for
particular technologies which is likely to determine whether or
not they will be undertaken in the private sector.
»f f
In making these assessments, there are no hard and fast
rules. For example, the duration of payback that a firm is
willing to accept depends upon the life cycle of its products.
An engine manufacturer is much more likely to expend its
resources on a new material for turbines that may not pay off for
fifteen years, than a new electronic control with a payback half
as long. The life cycles for electronic parts are typically far
too short to allow such long investment horizons.
It is outside the scope of this study to provide more
than the characteristics of projects in which the private sector
is unlikely to invest. But we are concerned especially about the
willingness of the private sector to invest in one type of R&D--
radically new technologies that would require wholesale changes
in large systems. Structural ceramics in turbines is one such
example. Typically, because they would not be relevant to
existing product concepts, such radical technologies would often
be unlikely to get out of the basic or most fundamental applied
levels of research. Funding levels would most likely be small.
Furthermore, the ultimate commercialization of such technologies
would almost inevitably require technology demonstrations since
wholesale changes in large systems would need to be tested in
full scale configurations before being considered for
certification and commercialization. It is extremely unlikely
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that the private sector would fund a technology demonstration of
a radically new technology if substantial technical risks remain.
Hazarding answers to our own questions with regard to
. f
structural ceramics, at their present stage of development:
o Firms do not currently include the technology in their
product concepts.
o The technical risk in commercial figurations would seem
to be high; currently, for example, the systems are not
reliable for one-time use in cruise missiles.
o The technology appears to be about 20-30 years from
commercialization, well beyond the 15 year duration of
even the longest corporate planning horizons.
o The size of the project at each stage in the R&D
process may exceed that which is typical.
o The technology does not appear to be well enough
developed to even hazard a guess as to ultimate
capturability of benefits to the first firm to enter
the market, but the present early experiments would
seem to have wide applications, including to auto-
mobiles, and so are not likely to be capturable solely
to aeronautics firms. Indeed, the Japanese are funding
a cooperative research program in this area which
includes both automobile and aeronautics firms.
These attributes of structural ceramics projects, assuming
their technical merit and social value, would seem to make them
candidates for NASA funding.
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We suggest that the application of these questions to
other emerging aeronautics technologies will aid NASA in making
appropriate funding decisions.
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